Lee Salter

Truth, Politics and Representations of the Invasion of Iraq

‘United States officials were surprised and heartened today at the size of turnout in South Vietnam's presidential election despite a Vietcong terrorist campaign to disrupt the voting. According to reports from Saigon, 83 percent of the 5.85 million registered voters cast their ballots yesterday. Many of them risked reprisals threatened by the Vietcong. A successful election has long been seen as the keystone in President Johnson's policy of encouraging the growth of constitutional processes in South Vietnam’ (Peter Grose, 'U.S. Encouraged by Vietnam Vote,' New York Times article 4th September, 1967)

In the 1970s the German-American philosopher, Hanna Arendt became concerned with the relationship between politics and truth. Spurred by the US invasion of Vietnam, Arendt sought to understand the motivations of politicians in the American government – how could they have got things so wrong? Arendt concluded that though ‘no-one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms… [or] counted truthfulness among the political virtues’ a certain mould of modern politicians had become so far removed from simple factual truths that they can no longer be competent actors, but act nevertheless. On the other hand Arendt saw “truth tellers”, who she seems to have identified as journalists, are not persons of action because, ‘the teller of factual truth, when he enters the political realm and identifies himself with some partial interest and power formation, compromises the only quality that could have made his truth appear plausible, namely his personal truthfulness, guaranteed by impartiality, integrity, independence’. In contrast “modern political liars” act in such a way as to hoodwink the public, political power prevents citizens from comprehending what is by distorting or even eliminating factual truth, and without knowing what is, we cannot know what to change.
Arendt’s claims are important today, with the clear public mistrust in politics and media. If we supplement Arendt’s claims, though, then we can perhaps better evaluate what we know about current political events, in this instance, the invasion of Iraq by British and US military forces. First off, the juxtaposition of truth and lie is not so straight forward. Indeed, one can deceive without lying; deceive whilst telling factual truth. For example, if I were to renege on a commitment to assist a friend by falsely claiming to have a conflicting appointment with a doctor, this is a straightforward lie. However, if I were to arrange an appointment with a doctor so that when I inform my friend that I have a conflicting appointment I am telling the truth, this is not a lie, it is factual truth. In this instance, though, the factual statement is true, though there is deception; it is the act that is deceptive though the reporting of it is truthful. Nevertheless, the disinterested reporting of the fact contributes to the deceit. What this tells us is that rather than political or social power having the last say on factual truth, it may often have the first say – it creates the facts in the first place. The point here is that facts are not things that exist only to be either cleanly communicated or perverted by politics, rather many facts are created in the first place by political power. We only need to think of the fact that “property is very unevenly distributed in even the most egalitarian states” to understand that “property” and “state” are political constructions in the first place – the things to which the sentence refers are political constructions.
The second supplement relates to the communication of the facts. The reporting of the fact that “property is very unevenly distributed in even the most egalitarian states” constrains responses to it. In this instance, the response to the fact might be, “then property should be more evenly distributed in such states”. However, this exchange leaves the fact of property and the fact of the state unquestioned. Of course, Arendt’s response is that the truth-teller should not be active, but should, with ‘his personal truthfulness, guaranteed by impartiality, integrity, independence’ tell what is, leaving it as it is. However, in this instance the truth-teller is, without lying, actively sustaining the naturalism of property and the state.
To further illustrate the difficulties in dealing with “factual truth” I will turn to look at how a particular event – the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq – has occurred and how “the press” has told of this fact. In attempting to illustrate the problem of this factual truth and its communication I will recount some of the major events that have taken place during the invasion, how they have developed, how they are reported and how the development of events and the reporting of them intercede. It is reasonably well known that so many news organisations (such as The Sun newspaper in the UK or Fox News in the US – both owned by Rupert Murdoch) clearly lost any pretence of professional independence in the build up to and during the invasion, and I am not interested in such blatant propaganda. Rather the attempts to mediate the events and facts by those who seem to retain ‘personal truthfulness, guaranteed by impartiality, integrity, independence’ pose a far greater problem for those trying to understand the facts. For this reason, I will focus on the BBC.

Background: The Invasion of Iraq

In the first part of 2003 the citizens of the USA and the UK were subject to an onslaught of claims about the behaviour of the Iraqi government. President George Bush of the USA and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the UK had agreed to overthrow President Saddam Hussein of Iraq as early as 2002 (The Times, 1st May 2005: p.1), and then needed to manufacture the consent of their publics and of the leaders of other states. Presuming that their respective publics would not agree to invade another country on the basis of regime change, a programme of careful deceit was initiated by both governments. Though US citizens were perhaps more ready than UK citizens to accept regime change as a rationale , tenuous – and unlikely – links between the Iraqi government and al Qaeda asserted by the US government must have contributed to some 70% of Americans believing, against the facts, that the Iraqi government had something to do with the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 (Washington Post 6th September 2003: p. A01. Even by 2005 47% of American believe that President Hussein ‘helped plan and support the hijackers’ [Harris Poll #14 18th February 2005], which was largely inferred in President Bush’s speeches [Christian Science Monitor 14th March, 2003] and the utterances of other US Government officials – see Rampton and Stauber, 2003: 94-95 for a list of these). These fears were the hooks to which supposed threats from Iraq were attached. The British government on the other hand had no such reference points. Instead though ‘Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran’, it was thought that ‘it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors’ (Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting 23rd July 2002, cited in The Times, 1st May 2005: p.1). It seems that British government policy was to create a situation in which President Hussein would be seen to defy the UN, and thereby justify the real objective of regime change. Both governments sought to manipulate public fears – about terrorist links and weapons of mass destruction respectively – in order to manufacture consent for their intended actions.
On 19th March 2003, war was declared on Iraq and the invasion began. By 1st May 2003 President Bush had declared an end to “major combat operations” – the declared war was over and the Iraqi government had been defeated. Whether or not as a result of distorted intelligence given to the US by disgruntled Iraqis, the expected streets-paved-with-flowers to welcome the invading forces did not materialise at any significant rate, despite attempts by mainstream media in the UK and US to make it appear so. Instead, the invasion forces were met with stiff resistance after the end to “major combat operations”. Accordingly what plans there were for a post-invasion Iraq were uncertain and constantly changed (New York Times 18th January 2004: section 4 p. 5). In Arendt’s terms, this was the ‘ever-changing affairs of men, in whose flux there is nothing… permanent’. The initial invasion was followed by the setting up of a Coalition Provisional Authority (CAP) headed by a US-appointed foreign “civilian administrator”, Paul Bremer. This can not have seemed other than a neo-colonial occupation, with a secular neo-liberal reform agenda that intended to shape Iraq in the interests of the US government, and thus intensified the resolve of those Iraqis opposed to the invasion. In June 2003 all self-rule was in towns and cities was ended by the US occupying force and in July of that year the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council was formed. By 14th November 2003, in the face of increasing levels of violence against the occupiers, the Bush Administration had decided to transfer power to an interim government by early 2004. In March 2004 the Iraqi Governing Council signed an interim constitution, and on 28th June 2004 all authority was passed to the Iraqi Interim Government and the CPA was dissolved. All through this period a violent campaign raged against the occupying powers and despite the attempt to legitimise the invasion, in a poll conducted by the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2004, 92% of Iraqis saw the U.S. as “occupiers”, 3% saw them as “peacekeepers” and only 2% Iraqis viewed them as “liberators” (CPA web site June 17th 2004). On 3rd May 2005 the “democratically elected” Iraqi Government proper replaced the Iraqi Interim Government.

Saying What Is

Considerations of US military strategy in Iraq must be considered dialectically. Regardless of how well or how badly planned a military and political strategy is, without adapting to the conditions under which that policy is enacted, such strategies will fail. In the case of Iraq, the US’s initial policy was mitigated by the Iraqis who resisted the invasion. As the CPA poll showed, the vast majority of Iraqis saw the US as an occupying power. This perception helped fuel the resistance to the perceived occupation, which in turn saw the US speed up the establishment of a “sovereign” Iraqi government. This latter strategy was, then, aimed at quelling the resistance to the objectives of the US government. What is important in this turn of events is that it – intentionally or otherwise – alters how we conceive of the two sides (to simplify) in the conflict, indeed it alters the reality of the situation insofar as the terms used often correspond to rights as legal subjects. I will now turn to the BBC’s conception of the conflict.
The BBC probably gets as close to impartiality, integrity, independence as any news organisation might. Its Charter and Agreement (Department of National Heritage, 1996) calls for it to ‘contain comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage of news and current affairs’ and to ‘treat controversial subjects with due accuracy and impartiality’. The BBC has no corporate backers, no financial investors, no direct advertising in its domestic television operations, and there is very little direct government intervention in the day-to-day running of the news operation (save for renewing the BBC’s charter as a whole, legislating for the licence fee funding and the appointment of BBC Governors).
BBC news’ accuracy and impartiality are constantly reflected upon by its journalists and editors, whose decisions are open to scrutiny from viewers. This scrutiny is intended to ensure that the BBC’s reporting represents “factual truth” as accurately and disinterestedly as possible. The BBC’s reporting on the invasion of Iraq did not escape such scrutiny, with journalists and editors struggling to find the right words to define the events and facts as they appeared. One such difficulty related to the definition of the Iraqis who fought against the invasion and occupation, who the BBC defined as “insurgents”. In response to questions about the choice of words the BBC argued that,

‘This term was decided upon because it describes people who are “rising in active revolt”. It is the best word to use in situations of rebellion or conquest when there is no free-standing government.’ (Boaden, 2004)

To assess the accuracy of the BBC’s account of the invasion, and in particular its use of the term “insurgent”, a number of factors need to be considered: firstly, it has to be determined whether the BBC’s definition of the word is accurate; secondly, the history and current uses of the term outside the reporting of Iraq can be used to illustrate the connotations of the term; thirdly, it must be considered whether the use of other terms reflects the changing conditions of the invasion and occupation.
In accord with the above concerns with Arendt’s analysis, it is expected that the nature of the facts and events in the invasion should not be understood as simply occurring, and that the terms being used, whilst perhaps accurate in some contexts, have connotations that prevent the BBC from merely and passively saying “what is”. In the first instance, BBC’s representation of the invasion and occupation may not reflect the changing relations between Iraqis and the invasion forces (that is because power interests have the first say in how the situation is). In the second, connotations of terms arise within the discursive structures in which those terms are placed. Accordingly, it is difficult for “us” to ‘find our bearings’ on this issue, despite the absence of ‘deliberate falsehood, the plain lie’.

The accuracy of the term “insurgent”

Whilst the BBC claims that “insurgent” ‘describes people who are “rising in active revolt”’, in ‘situations of rebellion or conquest where there is no free-standing government’, this does not tally with most dictionary definitions. Most dictionary definitions are similar to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’s definition, which suggests that the term refers to ‘a person who rebels or rises in revolt against an authority’ (emphasis added). This is to say, all dictionary definitions that the writer has encountered relate the insurgent to an authority. Therefore there is little justification for the application of the term to situations in which there is no ‘free-standing government’. This point is reinforced by the fact that it is difficult to ‘rise in active revolt’ when there is no ‘free standing government’ to rebel against. To turn to authorities on “low intensity warfare”, General Sir Frank Kitson (1971: 6) describes insurgency as ‘the use of armed force by a section of the people against the government’ with the intention of overthrowing it.
Static dictionary definitions of words are only one source of meaning. Indeed, both philosophers argued that the meaning of words becomes affirmed in their use. Perhaps, then, the BBC’s use of the term “insurgent” corresponds to their usual use of the term? However, a brief survey of BBC News Online’s use of the term shows that it has been used to refer to situations in Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yeman, India, Algeria, Rwanda, Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia, Uganda, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Congo, Macedonia, Columbia, Liberia, but never used to refer to contemporary struggles in the Basque Country, Corsica or the Northern Ireland. As regards the latter, at best any reference to the republican struggle in Northern Ireland refers, on special occasion, to the UK's “counter-insurgency” operations. We see, then that the term is applied to situations in which there are people who are ‘rising in revolt’ and in ‘situations of rebellion’, but almost always against an established government or authority. It is also interesting to see that the term is used almost exclusively to refer to “third world”, or very poor, states, often those that have experienced colonial rule. In fact it is perhaps most commonly used in relation to anti-colonial struggles – the BBC refers to “counter insurgency” operations against anti-colonial struggles in Kenya, Cyprus, Malaya and Aden, or in relation to “communist insurgencies” such as in Malaya, Nepal or Columbia, creating clear connotations for the “insurgency” in Iraq. From my survey I have not found the term to have been used to describe resistance to an invasion. Nor has the term been used to describe people acting against the internationally recognised governments of Ukraine, Georgia and Zimbabwe. Instead these insurgents are referred to as “protestors”, “the opposition”, “demonstrators”, their leaders are “firebrands” (BBC 2004, 2005a, 2005b), and their actions are “celebrated”. Clearly, though, those fighting the American-led invasion of Iraq are not like those who protested against the governments of Ukraine and Georgia. On the contrary, the latter were peaceful protesters relying on international recognition of their demonstrations alongside domestic support (especially from the military, if only in tacit form), and no doubt foreign pressure, in order to succeed.
Perhaps if we are to use historically informed terms to refer to current events, then we must look for similar historical events. Insurgents fighting established British and British-allied colonial authorities in Kenya are different to Iraqis fighting invading armies. Certainly the latter are different to Nepalese Maoists fighting the indigenous monarchists, and different to insurgent groups fighting settled governments and authorities elsewhere. Perhaps there is more similarity between the Iraqis fighting the US-led invasion and the circumstances and tactics of the French resistance, who initially fought against the invasion of their state by another, and who then waged an underground guerrilla war of bombings and assassinations to prevent the invaders and their indigenous collaborators from settling. Perhaps claims comprehension of factual truth can only be achieved if one takes an intersubjective position, that is, if one understands the different sides from their own perspective. In this case, we might see the US-UK “armed forces” confronting Iraqi and Islamic “freedom fighters”, for it is clear that their lives are dedicated to being free from US and UK influence. To be sure, there are many Americans who would agree that to be truly free is to be subject to the will of god, and this is how at least a reasonably large minority of those fighting the invasion wish to be.
Should the Iraqis who fought the invasion have therefore been referred to as Iraqi freedom fighters or the Iraqi resistance? We can see that the possible terms, “freedom fighters”, “resistance” and “insurgents” have clear connotations resulting from their situation in already existing discourses. The “resistance” were on “our” side against the Nazis, whereas the Kenyan, Malay or today’s Nepalese “insurgents” are not on “our” side. From the British point of view, the Kenyan, Malay and Nepalese insurgencies lacked legitimacy as they were against “legitimate” authorities. On the other hand, the French resistance was against an (from “our” point of view) illegitimate occupier. Perhaps, though, there is a simpler reason for not using the term “resistance”? Perhaps the static dictionary definition will show that the term is an inaccurate description of what is taking place in Iraq? To return, then, to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary we see that “resistance” simply means ‘the action or act of resisting, opposing or withstanding’, the ‘power or capacity of resisting’. Perhaps the dictionary definition of “resistance” is therefore more appropriate to describe the situation in Iraq? On the other hand, perhaps changing circumstances, the ‘ever-changing affairs of men, in whose flux there is nothing… permanent’, means that any single term is an inappropriate representation? To follow this point requires us to return to the chronology of the invasion.
As outlined above, we might consider the invasion of Iraq in stages. In the first stage, between March and May 2003 the initial invasion took place. On 1st May 2003 the end to “major combat operations” was declared. Soon after this the second stage began with the setting up of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA period lasted from 16th May 2003 until 28th June 2004. From 28th June 2004 until 3rd May 2005 the Iraqi Interim Government was in power in the third period. In each of these periods the “authority” or “government” against which the “insurgent” acted was different. In the first instance there was no authority to speak of, it was an invasion. In the second period a foreign power ruled over Iraq and in the third period what might otherwise be referred to as a “puppet regime” was installed. At best in the first and second periods an occupying power dominated Iraq and in the third and fourth a more or less legitimate authority had been established. We might consider, then, that in the first and second periods resistance to an invasion took place in which, in the first instance, soldiers fought against an invading army, and in the second resistance took place against an occupying army. In the third and fourth period, the resistance was replaced by an insurgency against an indigenous authority and government. We might expect, then, that the telling of “what is” would reflect these changing circumstances. However, the BBC has been using the term “insurgents” since at least July 2003, that is, since the beginning of the second period, the period of occupation by a foreign power. Whilst perhaps the term “insurgency” might be appropriate under the third and fourth periods, under the first and second periods it cannot be considered to be an accurate representation of reality. To boot, the degree to which the term can be applied to the third and fourth periods depends on the degree to which the authority or government against which it is taking place is legitimate or seen as legitimate.
Despite the attempts to justify it, the reason for the choice of the term “insurgency” by the BBC is unclear. The BBC justification cited above seems to be simply wrong, certainly as far as it relates to the use of the term prior to the third period. Perhaps the choice could be explained by drawing on Stuart Hall’s (Hall et al, 1978) concept of “primary definers” – key government figures, experts and “authorities” – to which mainstream media are too often in subservient relation. There is some evidence for this. For instance, the UK Parliament Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report cites various experts referring to the insurgency in Iraq in 2003, and in the Minutes of Evidence for the Committee, Jonathan Stevenson of the International Institute for Strategic Studies refers to an insurgency having taken place as early as 1st May 2003 (Stevenson, 2004). At the same hearings, Dr Toby Dodge (2004) also referred to the insurgency that he had witnessed in May 2003. Of course, this is the instance at which we consider primary definers not as individual agents who exert undue influence on language use, but as key voices in particular discourses – in this instance, military discourse.

Conclusion

Perhaps what we are witnessing are Arendt’s “modern political lies” which are ‘so big that they require a complete rearrangement of the whole factual texture – the making of another reality into which they will fit without seam, crack or fissure’. There is certainly an element of Arendt’s concept of the modern political lie that tallies with the case of Iraq. To be sure, the “factual texture” has been rearranged, and the words used to describe actors, whether they be “terrorist” in the US or “insurgent” in the UK, do usually fit without seam. In this instance we see that the BBC is perhaps reporting “truthfully” and their reports are “factually accurate” in many respects, but this is only the case from within the UK governmental and military discourse. The BBC’s reporting both reflects and reinforces this discourse. The governmental and military discourse becomes the primary discourse against which “Others” are judged. To illustrate this influence, Lewis and Brookes’ (2004) content analysis of the BBC’s coverage of the build up to the invasion and the invasion itself found that 56% of sources used came from the UK and US government and military. The stating of what was happening by these sources can then be truthfully and accurately reported. However, even if it were the case that in the third and fourth period the BBC’s reporting was accurate, then it would still reinforce the dominant UK-US discourse. That is, it would not be how Iraqis see themselves.
The above possibility presents us with another problem in applying the concept of the “modern political lie”. For Arendt, the modern political lie is juxtaposed to the ‘facts… in their own original context’, and becomes a substitute for ‘reality and factuality’ (1993: 154). However, as I have tried to establish, the reality and the facts have been changed in Iraq to bring about a new situation to which a discourse correctly corresponds. To say what is in this situation would involve the continual recognition that the correct use of the term “insurgent” in the third and fourth period is only so due to the political manoeuvring that changed the reality of the situation before it is represented. In effect the American government sought to set up the conditions in which the resistance was delegitimised. The reason that the fighters have become insurgents, that is the reason that the same representation has moved from false to true, is because of the intentional actions of US planners to establish a new reality. A puppet interim government and an agreeable elected government have taken away the discursive landscape in which resistance can occur. As in Chile in the 1970s, in Iraq today the American government has engineered a reality to which their actions respond and to which ideological discourse corresponds. Such manipulation of a situation does not require lies. All involved can tell the truth, can be truthful, without facilitating adequate understanding. The problem with such a situation is that as Arendt rightly points out, without understanding what is, proposals for what can be, whether militarily or otherwise, are likely to rest on unstable foundations. Indeed, neutral reporting of factual truth also allows itself to presuppose the conceptual scheme of those with the power of definition, allowing the latter to frame all subsequent events and factual truths. This framing then goes on to prompt audience expectations in future and so on. So, if the representation of factual truths ignores activity at the same time at which it positions those mere facts within already existing discursive relations, then there is little chance of citizens comprehending the full situation, with all of the consequences that entails. Alternatively, it should be recognised that in the first instance “factual truths”, simple facts and brutally elementary data are always brought into being, they never simply exist. Facts are not mere facts, they are the results of action, and are therefore subject to evaluation. The claim to neutrality in certain modes of representing reality masks the activity, which Arendt denies, that lays behind factual truth. This passivity does nothing to unmask power and does little to help our understanding of situations.